Merz’s Charade With The Tropical Forest Fund

Germany is set to contribute one billion euros to the new Tropical Forest Forever Facility. Brazilian President Lula launched the project, which is officially intended to protect the rainforest. Yet there may be more behind it than environmental protection.

The German Chancellor Friedrich Merz is regarded as a generous man, at least abroad. There, in November 2025, at the COP30 summit in Belém, Brazil, amid the applause of the climate community, he promised a rather special gift: Germany will contribute one billion euros to the new Tropical Forest Forever Facility (TFFF). The acronym stands for a permanently established fund initiated by Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, which, according to the official narrative, is intended to protect and reforest the rainforest. Ecological projects, such as support for indigenous communities, are also to be financed from its capital flows.

An ambitious undertaking that demands immense financial resources. The fund’s financing follows a familiar political architecture: A group of states including Germany, France, Norway, Brazil and Indonesia is to provide base capital of 25 billion U.S. dollars. In Germany’s case, the billion is to come from the Climate and Transformation Fund, a special fund that does not appear in the federal budget and is therefore initially obscured in the Federal Republic’s official debt statistics. The German taxpayer pays for the billion through rising interest rates in the capital markets, since the special fund, too, can ultimately only be financed through the issuance of further government bonds.

Once parked in the fund, the board of directors, in which donor and forest countries are represented equally, plans to leverage the state money by a factor of four through a stream of private capital. The investments are managed by the Luxembourg-based Tropical Forest Investment Fund, while the World Bank acts as trustee.

The fund’s mechanics are anchored in the bond market. Germany’s sponsor capital serves as the first-loss buffer, enabling the TFFF to issue highly rated bonds on international capital markets. Their yield will be markedly below the interest rates on the government bonds of those countries to which the credit is intended to flow.

The yield on ten-year Brazilian government bonds currently stands at around 15.6 percent. According to the TFFF’s financial paper, the return on bonds issued to private investors is to be oriented toward long-term U.S. Treasury yields, plus a spread dependent on the final rating. A fixed yield range cannot yet be derived from this. However, ten-year US Treasuries currently yield around 5.1 percent — a nominal interest differential of roughly 10.5 percentage points against ten-year Brazilian government bonds becomes visible here. A so-called carry trade emerges: the financing of a credit flow in a foreign currency space, most likely the dollar, in order to invest the capital in a high-interest-rate environment.

For here comes the next step in the fund’s mechanics: The capital raised through bond issuances is invested mainly in the bonds of the relevant states. However, the portfolio is more broadly structured: It is also to purchase liquid government and corporate bonds with a substantial share from ODA-eligible, that is, development-assistance-eligible countries under OECD criteria, with Brazil expected to be the most important investment market. From the interest differential thus created, a financial margin emerges that is then intended to finance political projects such as reforestation projects or similar initiatives.

Moreover, the timing of the entry point is interesting: The U.S. dollar is currently trading at a relatively high level against major currencies such as the euro, the Japanese yen, and the British pound, compared with the long-term historical average. The issuers of the TFFF may be speculating that a depreciation movement will set in over the coming years, which could make the fund’s future refinancing easier.

Using Brazil as an example, one can see what political implications the fund’s money may have. If the TFFF purchases Brazilian government bonds in the future, Brazil’s government will presumably receive fresh capital at a lower interest rate. This is not insignificant in view of a budget deficit of 8.2 percent of gross domestic product and a yield of over 15 percent. Brazil, like the eurozone, is moving toward an extremely dangerous debt spiral.

The TFFF funds will initially create room in the budget. We know this pattern from the financing of ecological projects in France and Italy through the first major eurobond, NextGenerationEU. Here, too, a joint loan was taken on and earmarked funds were allocated to member states, creating room in national budgets for social spending and other political projects.

It is very likely that budgetary questions will be just as central to the TFFF’s financing as the protection of future trade flows in the country’s resource sector. Above all, crude oil, coffee, soybeans, as well as iron and steel products, are among the country’s most important export goods. The sword of Damocles of a severe budget crisis still hangs over Brazil. Such a crisis could destabilize the entire continent and turn the region into a second Venezuela.

Against this background, the Tropical Forest Fund appears to be the kind of supranational credit vehicle typical of the fiat-money system, through which over-indebted states attempt to create a new financing layer in order to temporarily relieve pressure on public budgets. We are witnessing a similar debate in the EU: There, the Commission is working at full speed on the further introduction of eurobonds such as NextGenerationEU, in order to consolidate high national government debts under its umbrella and, with Germany as the credit anchor, create a fully integrated government debt market.

It fits the picture that the Heinrich Böll Foundation has critically examined the fund’s structure and warns that possible projects could fail because of fluctuations in the bond and foreign-exchange markets. The suspicion therefore hardens: Brazil needs funds for its state budget. The rainforest merely provides a new financing backdrop.

From the perspective of the German taxpayer, too, this question arises: Is this about forest protection, or rather about a new layer of state credit creation?

Until the first project financing takes place, this question remains unanswered.

It is reasonable to assume that behind Germany’s billion-euro subsidy lies merely another blank check, the beneficiaries of which hide in the background of a state-funded climate economy. In this case, it carries the label of rainforest protection.

americanthinker

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