With eight months to go until the French presidential election, Jean-Luc Mélenchon has achieved what many of his opponents seem incapable of doing: giving his campaign a genuine sense of momentum. The centre remains divided between the Macron-aligned candidatures of the two former prime ministers, Édouard Philippe and Gabriel Attal, the Right is struggling to establish its own narrative, and the non-Mélenchonist Left is still searching for a formula that would allow it to make its mark.
Meanwhile, La France Insoumise (LFI), with its summer university in Châteauneuf-sur-Isère, has just staged a show of strength designed to convey a simple message: the momentum is on its side. More than 8,000 people were expected to attend—an unprecedented turnout for the movement—whilst Mélenchon, who officially announced his candidacy in May, brought the gathering to a close by declaring that “victory is possible.”
The strategy is now well known, but it could work once again. Mélenchon is seeking to present himself not as just another candidate on the Left, but as the only one capable of reaching the second round. The aim is to replicate—with some adaptations—the 2022 strategy: gradually convincing left-wing voters that tactical voting does not mean choosing their preferred candidate but the one who is mathematically most likely to survive the first round. However, unlike in 2022, Mélenchon now finds himself in a much more favourable environment for this approach. The Left is deeply divided, the Socialists and the Greens are unable to reach agreement, and the ‘Insoumis’ candidate benefits from a grassroots organisation that is operating at full capacity.
Voter surveys are beginning to reflect this dynamic. A poll published by Harris Interactive on Monday 24 August 2026 places Mélenchon in a position to qualify for the second round.
In three of the five scenarios tested, he comes second behind Marine Le Pen, securing 16–17% of the vote, compared with 35–38% for Le Pen. The increase is clear: Harris had him at 12% in April; he is now at 16–17%.
This increase must, of course, be put into perspective: we are still a long way from the election, and the margins of error make any overly precise interpretation of a few polling points illusory. Nevertheless, it remains politically significant because it comes at a time when rival candidates are struggling to generate comparable momentum. Between Édouard Philippe and Gabriel Attal, the only notable activity resembles an internal battle for leadership of the centre bloc rather than a genuine presidential campaign capable of galvanising the electorate.
For his part, Mélenchon is fine-tuning his narrative. He presents himself as the man of radical change but also as the one who could embody a comprehensive alternative to Marine Le Pen. During a meeting with his supporters, he emphasised environmentalism, economic transformation, and the need to break with current policies whilst promising to veto the Lecornu government’s next budget. He is beginning to cultivate his image as a candidate capable of exercising power, with a more presidential demeanour and a discourse seeking to move beyond LFI’s identity as merely a protest movement.
The entry of left-wing candidate Raphaël Glucksmann into the race poses a serious obstacle for Mélenchon. The co-chair of centre-left Place publique officially announced his candidacy on August 23, stating that he would take part in the primary organised jointly with the Socialist Party in the autumn and that he intended to rebuild a democratic Left without La France Insoumise. His 14% share of the vote in the 2024 European elections gives him an electoral credibility that few left-wing figures can claim. But he still lacks what Mélenchon has in abundance: a highly mobilised activist base and the ability to inspire passion. At this stage, Glucksmann appears more as a potential catalyst for the reorganisation of the centre-left than as the popular phenomenon capable of turning the tables.
Should we, then, take the risk of Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s election seriously? At present, he is by no means a favourite. Mélenchon remains deeply unpopular amongst large sections of the French public, and even within the Left, there is considerable resistance to him: a recent survey highlights that a significant proportion of left-wing voters explicitly reject him, notably out of fear of what LFI represents in democratic and institutional terms.
But this is precisely where the danger lies. Mélenchon is an extraordinarily skilful, devious and chameleon-like politician, who knows better than almost any of his opponents how to alter his political image without necessarily changing his objective. The Mélenchon of 2027 may be less abrasive than that of 2022, more presidential, more patriotic, more environmentally conscious and more concerned with reassuring the business community and moderate voters. He knows full well that his main weakness is not his electoral base but his glass ceiling.
For the time being, Mélenchon’s entry into the race remains Marine Le Pen’s best guarantee of reaching the second round. A left divided between Mélenchon supporters, Social Democrats and Greens risks turning the election into a mechanical contest from which Mélenchon could emerge victorious on the Left without necessarily securing a national majority. But it would be unwise to take a Le Pen–Mélenchon run-off for granted or to assume that such a scenario would necessarily be unfavourable to the LFI candidate.
For there is one variable that the polls fail to capture accurately: the ability of the French media and cultural establishment to shift abruptly when an election enters its decisive phase. The candidate currently portrayed as the absolute pariah could, if circumstances demanded it, become the ‘republican camp’s’ candidate against the Rassemblement National (RN) tomorrow. Some of the elites who are fighting Mélenchon today might then come to see, by comparison with Marine Le Pen, the virtues of his so-called moderation.