The channel info on YouTube reads more innocuously than the self-description of a scout group: hate and violence against individuals or groups are not advocated or supported. ‘We want to promote dialogue, contribute to education and better coexistence in society,’ it says. But if you take a closer look, you quickly realise that the content of the channel is by no means harmless and peaceful. In fact, the group ‘Nūr al “Ilm | Light of Knowledge” is a particularly radical Islamist group that has remained invisible up to now – and is courting young people.
With more than 100 videos, the channel gives an impression of what they are taught in the youth camps, Quran reading sessions or Islamic lessons. The clip ‘Lessons from the Battle of Uhud’, for example, states that the Prophet was of the opinion ‘that we, the believers, should wait for the kuffar in Medina, that the kuffar will come in and that the kuffar will then be slaughtered in Medina – from the sides and from the houses’. ‘Streetfight in Medina.’ The kuffar stands for unbelievers, an expression that Islamists repeatedly use to devalue non-Muslims.
In the video about the Prophet Lut, on the other hand, the following relationship to homosexuality is conveyed: ‘Homosexuality, of course, is not a minor sin, but a major sin. […] And you know it is killed in Islam. If you see someone doing the deed, then you should kill both: the one who does it and the one with whom it is done. Both must be killed.’ Some scholars would have deduced that the sinner should be thrown from a high building or burned to death. ‘Sin is very bad in Islam.’
And: The chastisement of women is also described as a permissible act of violence. ‘If she still persists in [wrong behaviour], he hits her – but not hard, not in the face and without leaving any marks. He may also beat her if she neglects the duties of Allah,’ says another video.
The same video also indirectly legitimises the murder of critics of Islam. It is about the Dutchman Theo van Gogh, who was killed by the radical Islamist Mohammed Bouyeri in 2004. Van Gogh had previously repeatedly mocked Allah and the prophet Mohammed. ‘He insulted the prophet – and then he was stabbed to death in the street. Was the murder a good thing? It brings greater harm, to be honest. You weigh up the harm against the benefit.’ From an Islamic point of view, however, ‘it wouldn’t be wrong to kill someone like that’.
Dozens of such videos have been uploaded to Nūr al ‘Ilm’s YouTube channel, which is adorned with an open Koran from which rays of light are streaming and has just around 500 followers. They oscillate between question time and life advice, in which young people are told how to lead a life in accordance with the religion, and Quran recitations, in which the contents of the holy Islamic scripture are interpreted in an almost orthodox, literal manner – in the sense of the Sahaba and Salafiya, i.e. the ‘companions’ and ‘ancestors’. Salafists, including Nūr al ‘Ilm, refer to these scholars, who lived in the first generations of Muhammad, when they promote an Islamist lifestyle in the modern age. Here, too, reference is made to Islamic historical events such as battles and Qur’anic surahs.
Youth camps, so-called brotherhood meetings, are held in numerous videos. At the centre of the group is a stocky man with a shaved short haircut and a full beard who calls himself Abdur Rahman Shadid. He and his group are mainly active in northern Germany: events organised by Nūr al ‘Ilm take place in Bremen, Lübeck and the Assalam Mosque there, Delmenhorst, but also in North Rhine-Westphalia and Mannheim. Last year, a short pilgrimage with Shadid was available from the provider ‘Taibah Tours’ for the bargain price of 1400 euros.
NIUS wanted to know how the statements in the videos are to be interpreted and whether they are in line with the free and democratic basic order. The group left one enquiry unanswered until Sunday evening. It is unclear whether the catalogue of questions sent by NIUS was read at all.
This in turn is due to the conspiratorial nature of the group. Nūr al ‘Ilm resembles a black box, operating without an imprint and without a loadable address for justiciable content. Apart from the YouTube channel, there is no website, no email address and no telephone number that would allow contact to be made with the Islamists. Sermon content and share tiles are uploaded to Instagram. There is also an internal WhatsApp group to which hand-picked believers can be added. The conspiracy of the creators is also evident from the fact that a whole catalogue of questions must be answered – in addition to personal details, Arabic level and knowledge of the Koran are also requested – in order to be included in the select WhatsApp chat.
Virtually nothing can be found on the internet about the man at the centre of the group, Abdur Rahman Shadid. Information on Nūr al ‘Ilm is also scarce. The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution has just as little knowledge of the group’s structures as the state offices in Bremen and Schleswig-Holstein, according to an enquiry from NIUS. The latter point out that they only take action if they have ‘factual indications’ that suggest an anti-constitutional mindset – although Nūr al ‘Ilm was demonstrably active in both states.
Islamism expert Sigrid Herrmann warns against the structures of Nūr al ‘Ilm vis-à-vis NIUS: “The group is remarkable in its radicalism and its self-image,” says the 61-year-old. It is based on an ‘elite concept’ that only allows a small circle of young men to become part of a community. Herrmann sees the lack of information and the lack of transparency as a danger. ‘In the past, the danger of Islamist groups was measured by their size and prominence, but such closed systems are sometimes more dangerous for the radicalisation of individuals – and often go unnoticed because they operate decentrally and digitally.
There is one indication of the networking of Shadid’s group: in the Telegram group, one of the three administrators is identified with the username @ikzbremen. The abbreviation IKZ stands for the Islamic Cultural Centre.
The religious centre in the centre of Bremen is considered a meeting place for radical Salafists by constitutional watchdogs. The sermons held at the IKZ are often ‘directed against central constitutional principles and call for the deliberate exclusion and marginalisation of non-Muslims or supposed non-believers’, according to the Office for the Protection of the Constitution in response to an enquiry from NIUS. ‘In addition to a rejection of the Western legal system and values, the spread of anti-Semitic content and the propagation of the inequality of religions are evidence of the Islamist orientation of the IKZ.’ The sermons reveal ‘typical values and enemy images of Salafist ideology’ and aim to evoke a ‘feeling of superiority’ among listeners.
It is precisely these ideological components that can also be found in Nūr al ‘Ilm. For example, one video invokes the omnipotence of Allah in the fight against major powers such as the USA, Israel or Russia. ‘Allah is the King and Allah has power over everything. And Allah can destroy all these powerful countries in a second: Israel, the USA, the Soviet Union, Russia: all these big countries that you think: okay, they’re badass countries and they have big, badass weapons. It’s very easy [for Allah] to destroy them.’
In the manner of the TikTok preacher Abul Baraa, Abdur Rahman Shadid praised the question of how the fight against kuffar, i.e. unbelievers, could be waged in this day and age if one did not know whether women and children could be hit by bombs as a ‘very good question’. There is a general judgement in Islam ‘that we do not kill women and children and people who do not fight and people who are poor.’ But it goes on to say: ‘But what if we want to fight the kuffar, for example’ – and it is not possible to distinguish them from women, children and the poor? ‘Then it is possible’, the speaker concludes.
In the video ‘Al Jihad. Hanbali Fiqh’ not only advertises jihad as a duty of Muslims, but also makes it clear: ’Allah has commanded that his religion prevail over all religions and that his religion be practised everywhere and that he be called to everywhere, to his religion. And that the rules of his religion prevail everywhere.’
The group has made this a priority. In addition to the production of daily online content, dawah is also on the agenda. The term stands for Islamic proselytising in public spaces. Here, too, there are videos in which young people in caftans and with trimmed moustaches try to convert passers-by to Islam in pedestrian zones, for example in Bremen. The campaign is accompanied by religious music in Arabic and some of the young people hold Qurans up to the camera.
The campaign is inevitably reminiscent of the Koran distribution campaign ‘Lies’, in which Salafists campaigned for converts to Islam in numerous German cities from 2010 onwards. Well-known Islamists such as Ibrahim Abou-Nagie and his group ‘The True Religion’, which was later banned, were involved in the campaign. Attackers such as the Essen Sikh temple bomber had previously travelled through city centres distributing Korans.
For Islamism expert Sigrid Herrmann, this is a cause for concern: ‘Especially when Koran reading circles also carry out proselytising campaigns, security authorities should take notice.’ The connection to the IKZ Bremen, which is considered one of the centres for Salafist structures in northern Germany, is also a ‘red flag’ for her. ‘Dozens of Muslims from the ‘Lies’ environment had travelled to Syria and Iraq as fighters for the ‘Islamic State’.’
Meanwhile, Nūr al ‘Ilm continues to meet. Last weekend, the ‘third meeting of the Brothers’ took place in Gütersloh. In the centre of the flyer advertising the event is a sign that is very reminiscent of the ‘Seal of the Prophet’ – the symbol that the ‘Islamic State’ also prints on its flag. ‘Seal of the Prophets’ was also a spin-off of the Koran distribution campaign “Read” – and was listed in several constitutional protection reports.
For some, this may initially be pure Islamic trivia and pure coincidence. For others, it is evidence of Islamist continuities that will persist in 2025.
/ NIUS