Serious questions have arisen in the case surrounding the arrest of the Chinese-born parliamentary aide to AfD MEP Maximilian Krah suspected of spying for Beijing after it came to light that German intelligence agencies, despite working with and monitoring his activities for years, never informed Krah.
Suspicions about Krah’s aide were first reported by The European Conservative last April, which could have been cause for the German MEP to question the AfD’s parliamentary staff further about the perceived doubts about his assistant’s loyalties.
Days ago, the German press revealed that Jian Guo, the arrested parliamentary assistant, had in 2007 been listed as an informant for the Saxony State Office for the Protection of the Constitution (LfV). Over the next eight years, Guo is said to have provided the state intelligence agency with information about people, companies, and associations in Germany with potential links to China’s spy services.
In 2015, Saxony’s state intel office received a tip from the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) that Guo may have been acting as a double agent for the Chinese Communist Party’s secret services. Subsequently, the BfV’s counterespionage service began formally observing Guo. At one point, German secret service agents even questioned Guo about their suspicions, but were ultimately unable to legally confirm his alleged espionage activities.
Nevertheless, the BfV’s suspicions remained, leading to Guo’s removal from the list of registered informants in 2018. The intel agency’s monitoring of Guo’s activities did, however, continue up until his arrest in April.
Perplexingly, not only did the German state allow Guo to become a naturalized citizen despite his suspected espionage activities, but it failed to inform Krah about its suspicions against his parliamentary assistant, even though it would have been common practice to do so. Additionally, Guo’s file should have prevented him from passing the security check required to work in the EU Parliament—but oddly, it did not.
Hans-Georg Maaßen, the former president of the BfV, recently explained to Junge Freiheit the normal procedure in a case like this:
If there are actual indications that employees of Members of Parliament are working for a foreign intelligence service, the President of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, his deputy or, if he is prevented from doing so, the head of counterintelligence shall conduct awareness-raising talks with the Members of Parliament.”
This did not happen with Krah.
Krah believes neither the government’s failure to inform him about the suspicions against his employee, nor the timing of the arrest are coincidences. The case, he suggests, is being used by Germany’s administrative state to cast him and the AfD in a particularly negative light ahead of the critical European elections in June, where the party is poised to perform well.
“The security authorities never warned me or informed me, contrary to their duty,” Krah said. “The security authorities obviously had knowledge, didn’t inform me, and dropped the bomb shortly before the [European] election date. That’s quite remarkable.” The timing and manner of action are “not a coincidence,” the MEP leading the AfD’s list contended.
The BfV’s failure to inform Krah and instead bring it before the public just before the elections makes sense if Thomas Haldenwang, the domestic intel chief’s, enmity toward the AfD is considered.
Haldenwang, breaking from a long-held tradition that has seen intel chiefs refrain from involving themselves in party politics, last year directly warned Germans not to vote for the AfD, claiming the party had elements within it that were opposed to the constitution.
So far, the BfV has not responded to press inquiries as to whether it had made Krah, AfD leadership, or anyone in the EU Parliament aware of its monitoring of Guo’s activities.